Lao Voices

Now and then it is useful to look back in history to see where the future will take us. A pivotal time in Lao history is the time between 1950 and 1975. During that time, the political regime in Laos was completely turned around. This was no coincidence. Laos was heavily divided by different military factions and corruption.

During the seventies, the war in Laos was essentially one between communist forces on the ground and American air power, for since the 1950’s, both the civilian and military arms of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) proved themselves to be ineffective allies for American objectives. In the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars article “No Place to Hide“, Fred Branfman describes the state of Laos during the seventies as “elitist, urban centered and riddled with corruption from top to bottom”.

Within this time frame, the RLG exercised varying control over 13 of Laos’ 16 provincial capitals and a series of district towns and small military outposts. In between these 13 RLG controlled areas was a shadowy no-man’s land where roving bands of communist guerrillas were master of the roads. RLG officials generally did not venture more than 8 to 15 miles from the provincial and district capitals. Much of their supplies were brought in by air.

Laos was divided into five military regions, each ruled by a coalition of right-wing generals and traditional ruling families. These five regions operated autonomously and proved themselves incapable of useful cooperation. Military Region 1, Luang Prabang, was dominated by General Ouane Rathikone, Commander in Chief of the Laotian Army. His main source of power is his exclusive control over the opium trade from northern Laos. His chief non-military support came from his alliance with the Royal family. Military Region 2, which included most of northeastern Laos, was an emerging Hmong (called Meo in those days) kingdom led by chief Vang Pao, who was supported directly by the United States.

Military Region 3, which includes most of central Laos, centers on Savannakhet. It is administered by General Bounphone, the weakest of the five military commanders, but in practice is run by Colonel Thao Ly. The real power in the region is the powerful Insisiengmay family, led by Leuam Insisiengmay, Vice-Premier and Minister of Education. Phoumi Nosavan retains a strong following and is actively involved in political maneuvering thanks to the millions of dollars he salted away during his heyday of American aid.

Military Region 4, with headquarters at Pakse, included the 6 provinces of southern Laos and was the traditional fief of the Na Champassak family whose leader, 15 Prince Boun Oum, dominated the area. In addition to his heritage, his chief sources of power are extensive commercial interests, ranging from tin mines, to vast landholdings, to transport and aviation companies, and arms trade with the communists. The commander of MR4 was General Prasook Sanly, perhaps the toughest of the Lao commanders.

Military Region 5 is comprised of Vientiane province, ruled by the Laotian military leader General Kouprasith Abhay. He himself belonged to the powerful Abhay family from Khong Island in southern Laos. He owned a widespread array of properties and commercial enterprises that included forests, sawmills, land and buildings within Vietiane city, agricultural land seized from farmers in the Ban Keun area, whorehouses, slot machines, a bowling alley, and transport contracts. In addition, he was awarded a percentage of ownership or profit from most other commercial activities carried out in his area. While he also received American aid, the foundation of Kouprasith’s power was his alliance with the Sananikone family (the Rockefellers of Laos).

The central government had little influence within these military regions, where the word of the military commander, and traditional families suporting him, were law. And the rivalries between military commanders and families allied with them prevented functional collaboration among regions. Neither the King nor the National Assembly wielded noticeable influence outside of Luang Prabang. In the south, the King was frequently ridiculed, particularly by Prince Boun Oum. A French friend repeated to this author one of Boun Oum’s favorite jests; “[I] would shoot the King in the head, but he’s so stupid that it would be a waste of the bullet.” Laotians regarded the National Assembly as a powerless debating club.

Corruption in Laos was present on every level of the military and civilian hierarchies. One could offer an endless list of types and techniques: land-grabbing, bribes for performing the simplest government functions, appropriating public funds for private use, and selling American-supplied commodities to whomever will buy them, with no questions asked. Business owners were compelled to pay crippling bribes directly to local military and civilian leaders to remain in business.

Fred Branfman concluded that “…the Royal Lao Government was simply too weak, divided, disorganized, urbancentered and corrupt to be viable.” At the same time, Laos was an integral part of an Indochinese theater in which the North Vietnamese were the dominant power. Given their demonstrated willingness to support the Pathet Lao, it was only a matter of time before the Pathet Lao gained sufficient momentum to take control of Laos. And they did.

Was the Pathet Lao takeover a good or bad thing for Laos? Those are normative questions, however, by analyzing the present Lao state in terms of health, education and economy their performance indicators are not doing well compared to global peers. And, human rights were heavily violated.

However, the Pathet Lao takeover did create the much needed unity and a powerful central goverment which Laos uitilized to battle fragmented interests. Building from this unity, there is hope for a better future when the communistic Lao government evolves into a regime that is more fruitful and democratic.